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"I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives":
The Case for Polygamous Marriage after United States
v. Windsor and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores
Peter Nash Swisher *
"Unconventional [marital] relationships between men and women are
now at least tolerated. We hear of.... . homosexual marriages, new types of
marriages are now advocated, and the institution of marriage, as well as the
conduct of married persons, is being subjected to fewer legal restraints. The
Victorian Age of [Chief Justicel Morrison Waite [who wrote Reynolds v.
United States in 1876] is far behind us... "
"Marriage is both a private and public institution. Although it involves
an individual's deeply personal decision to make a lifelong commitment to
another, states place strictures on who has the right to marry and confir
benefits and obligations on married individuals. Accordingly, legislatures
and courts have struggled to achieve a balance between the public and pri-
vate dimensions of marriage. A current example of this struggle is the na-
tionwide controvery over same-sex marriage. As marriage continues to be
re-conceptualized and re-structured, an interesting inquiry is whether the
traditional ban against polygamy will continue to be upheld."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Polygamous or plural marriage,3 like same-sex marriage, has long
been held to be void ab initio in the vast majority of American juris-
dictions. Polygamous marriage was recognized at one time in the
Utah Territory by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School. B.A., Amherst College; M.A., Stan-
ford University, J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law.
1. Ray Jay Davis, Plural Marriage and Religious Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. Unit-
ed States, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 302-03 (1973).
2. Alyssa Rower, The Legality of Polygamy: Using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 FAM. L.Q. 711 (2004).
3. The general term "polygamy" or plural marriage is used throughout this article, for
purposes of convenience, to include both polygyny, or the marriage of one man to two or more
women at the same time, and polyandry, or the marriage of one woman to two or more men at
the same time. It also includes bigamous marriages.
day Saints, commonly known as Mormons. In 1879, the United
States Supreme Court, in the case of Reynolds v. United States,4 held
that polygamy was an "odious" act that Congress had the legislative
power to prohibit. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing for the
Court, concluded that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere [religious] opinion, but was left free to reach actions which
were in violation of social duties or subversive of good moral order."'
No legal precedent was cited for this conclusion. Nevertheless, Reyn-
olds continues to be recognized as binding legal authority, prohibiting
polygamous marriages in America today.6
The purpose of this article is to question the continuing validity
of Reynolds in light of subsequent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, including-most recently-United States v. Windsor and Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.8 Based upon these subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 9 proponents of polygamous marriage now have a very strong
case for validating polygamous marriages on cultural, religious, and
constitutional grounds.
II. POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE: THE HISTORICAL BASIS
Whether the prohibition of a fundamental right to marry is sub-
ject to a compelling state interest, or only a rational basis test, gener-
ally has been determined by whether a person's "fundamental liberty
interests" are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple as to be ranked fundamental.""0 Accordingly, same-sex marriage,
lacking any historical basis, has been subjected only to a rational basis
test in a number of states.1 Polygamous marriage, on the other hand,
4. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
5. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
6. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985); Bronson v. Swenson,
394 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (D. Utah 2005); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
7. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, (2013).
8. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
9. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb.
(1993).
10. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). See also Cheshire Cal-
houn, Who's Afr'aid of Polygamous Mariage? Lessons for Same-Sex Ma-iiage Advocacy from the His-
tory of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1030 n. 39 (2005) ("It is important to bear in
mind that our U.S. tradition occurs within a multination state whose traditions include those of
Indian nations for whom monogamy was not always the defining form of marriage...").
11. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Bostic v.
Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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has enjoyed a rich historical tradition down through the ages, as illus-
trated below.
A. Biblical and Historical Polygamy
Polygamy is as old as man himself and polygamy has existed in
most of the world's known cultures, including ancient China, the In-
cas of Peru, the American Navajo, and the Macedonians of Persia.
During the age of the Old Testament patriarchs, Abraham, Esau, and
Jacob headed polygamous households, and the great kings of Israel,
David and Solomon, took plural wives, with apparent biblical approv-
al. Likewise, there was no prohibition of polygamy in the New Tes-
tament and it was practiced in Judea and Galilee during the ministry
of Jesus. 2 Moreover, under Islamic Shari'ah law, in the past and pre-
sent, a man may have up to four wives so long as he can adequately
provide for them and treat them justly. 3
Martin Luther, while not endorsing polygamy as an ideal prac-
tice, nevertheless observed that polygamy does not contradict Scrip-
ture and so cannot be prohibited by Christianity. 14 It was not until
the Council of Trent in 1563, that the Roman Catholic Church final-
ly prohibited the practice of polygamous marriage. 5 At this time,
monogamous marriage, according to one commentator, "became co-
extensive with religious devotion":
[A]dultery, fornication, and concubinage were deemed "sinful" and
outlawed... . In time, the Church came to exercise exclusive tem-
poral power over matrimonial matters, establishing monogamy as
the only legitimate marital form in Western Europe. Simultaneous-
ly, polygamy came to be identified in Christian ethnocentric
thought with the Moslem infidels and the heathens in "uncivilized"
lands, an attitude which has survived well into the twentieth [and
twenty-first] century. 16
12. See, e.g., G. Keith Nedrow, Polygamy and the Right to Marry: New Life for an Old Life-
style, 11 U.MEM. L. REV. 303, 307-08 (1981). See also Calhoun, supra note 10, at 1028 ("No-
where in the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament is polygamy forbidden").
13. See THE KORAN: WITH PARALLEL ARABIC TEXT 4:3 (N.J. Dawood trans., 2000).
14. PHILLIP KILBRIDE, PLURAL MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED OPTION?
63 (1994).
15. Id. at 64.
16. G. Keith Nedrow, supra note 12, at 309 (citing as authority JOHN CAIRNCROSS,
AFTER POLYGAMY WAS MADE A SIN: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN POLYGAMY
(1974)).
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Bigamy, the crime of taking more than one spouse at a time, be-
came punishable in English courts in 1604; in the United States, each
state eventually enacted its own bigamy statutes making plural mar-
riage a crime. Few persons were prosecuted under these bigamy laws
until the middle of the nineteenth century when Joseph Smith,
founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, exhorted
his followers to practice plural marriage as an article of faith. 7
B. Polygamy in America: The Mormon Experience
1. Early foundations
In the 1830s and 1840s, Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, encouraged his followers to em-
brace the practice of polygamy, emulating the Old Testament patri-
archs. In 1852, Brigham Young made an announcement of plural
marriage as an article of faith."8 Although only a small minority of
early Mormons practiced polygamy,19 and although Mormons treated
polygamy as a serious religious commitment,2° most Americans in the
nineteenth century were scandalized by polygamy as a "lascivious"
and "barbaric" practice and a sinful indulgence in sex.21 Anti-
polygamists of the nineteenth century often equated husband and
wives in a plural marriage to a slave master and slaves, regarding po-
lygamous marriages as "no better than Turkish harems, a practice de-
signed to serve male lust without women's willing consent. 22
17. Id. at 309-10.
18. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY EVANS, JOSEPH SMITH: AN AMERICAN PROPHET 271-72
(1933).
19. It is estimated that only five percent of Latter-Day Saints (most of whom were
church leaders) maintained polygamous households. RICHARD VAN WAGGONER, MORMON
POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 103 (2d ed. 1989). See also Elijah L. Milne, Blaine Amendments and Po-
lygamy Laws: The Constitutionality of Anti-Polygamy Law Targeting Religion, 28 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 257, 265-66 (2006). While most male Mormons remained monogamous, those who prac-
ticed polygamy generally married only one additional wife. Id.
20. One historian has observed: "Mormon plural marriage, dedicated to propagating the
species righteously and dispassionately, proved to be a rather drab lifestyle compared to the im-
aginative tales of polygamy, dripping with sensationalism, demanded by the scandal-hungry
eastern media market." WAGGONER, supra note 19, at 89.
21. See id.; Calhoun, supra note 10, at 1041.
22. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 10, at 1037-38. Abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe, for
example, compared polygamy to slavery; she argued that both were barbarous practices that
needed to be eradicated. See generally Sarah B. Gordon, A War of Words: Revelation and Storytell-
ing in the Campaign Against Mormon Polygamy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 739, 764-71 (2003).
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In contrast to this widespread nineteenth-century moralistic and
sensationalist view of polygamy, contemporary feminist-historian,
Joan Smyth Iversen, offers persuasive evidence that nineteenth-
century plural marriage was not a gender-discriminatory form of mar-
riage. Mormon-women's-rights-advocates argued at that time, that
plural wives, in fact, were more liberated than their New England
counterparts. In terms of educational and economic opportunities,
and in terms of civil and political rights, married Mormon women
rated quite well in comparison to New England women in monoga-
mous marriages.23 Each plural wife, for example, lived in her own
house functioning as the head of the household. Married-Mormon
women had the legal right to own property and sometimes owned
their own homesteads.24 Plural marriage also freed wives from some
of the evils of "male lust"-protecting them against diseases that
might be brought home from prostitutes and freeing pregnant wom-
en from marital sexual duties.25 Mormon women were among the
first women to vote in the United States2" and half of the first enter-
ing class at the University of Deseret (now the University of Utah)
were women.27 Many plural marriages involved well-educated wom-
en. Mormon women also were able to exit marriage through divorce,
with seventy-three percent of divorce actions in the Utah Territory
brought by women.28
All these arguments fell upon deaf ears. In 1856, four years after
Brigham Young's announcement endorsing polygamous marriage as
a Mormon article of faith, the Republican Party's national platform
called for the abolition of "those twin relics of barbarism-polygamy
and slavery" in the territories.29 Accordingly, six years later, in 1862,
in the midst of a bloody Civil War, the Radical Republicans in Con-
gress passed, and President Lincoln signed, the Morrill Anti-Bigamy
23. See generally JOAN SMYTH IVERSEN, TE ANTI-POLYGAMY CONTROVERSY IN U.S.
WVOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, 1880-1925: A DEBATE ON THE AMERICAN HOME (1997).
24. Id. at510-14.
25. Id. at 509.
26. Id. at 505.
27. Id. at 55.
28. Id. at 60.
29. REPUBLICAN PLATFORM OF 1856 in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS: 1840-1972, 27
(Donald Johnson and Kirk Porter eds., 5th ed. 1975). For a young Republican Party attempting
to replace the old Whig Party, this anti-polygamy and anti-slavery rhetoric became a key rally-
ing device. See Laura E. Brown, Regulating the Marrying KIGnd: The Constitutionality of Federal
Regulation of Polygamy Under the Mann Act, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267, 273 (2008).
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Act,3" which provided in relevant part:
[E]very person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any
other person, whether married or single, in a Territory... over
which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction ... [is] guilty of
bigamy and ... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hun-
dred dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding five years. 31
Enforcement of this Act was delayed for twenty-six years, but the first
case tried under this statute, Reynolds v. United States,32 became a
landmark case in the Supreme Court's continuing effort to define the
constitutional limits of religious freedom. 3
2. Reynolds v. United States
George Reynolds was an English immigrant to the United States.
He took Mary Ann Tuddenham as his wife soon after he settled in
the Utah Territory in 1865. By the time he had married a second
wife, Amelia Jane Schofield in 1874, Reynolds had acquired some
prominence as the private secretary of Brigham Young, the second
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Reyn-
olds' second marriage led to his indictment for the violation of the
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act. In his appeal to the Utah Territorial Su-
preme Court, Reynolds argued that his punishment for compliance
with his religious belief in plural marriage deprived him of his First
Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. Nevertheless,
the Territorial Supreme Court convicted him of bigamy.34
Approximately two years after Reynolds' conviction had been af-
firmed by the Utah Territorial Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court also affirmed Reynolds' conviction of bigamy under
the Morrill Act. Chief Justice Waite held in Reynolds v. United States35
that, although Congress could not legislate over "mere [religious]
opinion," it did have the power to prohibit "actions which were in vio-
lation of social duties or subversive of good moral order."' Reynolds
30. Act ofJuly 1, 162, ch. 1626, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1978).
31. Id.
32. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145 (1879).
33. See, e.g., Nedrow, supra note 12, at 312.
34. For an excellent history of the Reynolds decision, and other polygamy cases, see gener-
ally Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308 (1964).
35. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
36. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). For a comprehensive analysis of the Reynolds decision,
see Part M.A. infra.
[Vol. 29
was sent to prison where he served 19 months, receiving five months
off for good behavior. Reynolds then returned to Utah, where he was
hailed by his Mormon compatriots as a "living martyr."37 Four years
later he married wife number three, Mary Goold.3s
3. After Reynolds
The Reynolds decision had no immediate impact on Mormon po-
lygamy. Mormon attorneys found a procedural loophole in the Mor-
rill Act, and argued that the testimony of a second wife to establish a
pre-existing marriage of the first wife could not be used in court
since, until the first marriage could be established, the second wife
was prima facie presumed to be the lawful wife and she could not tes-
tify against her husband, presumably applying the last-in-time mar-
riage presumption.39 The United States Supreme Court agreed with
this reasoning in Miles v. United States,' reversing a bigamy convic-
tion of a Mormon man who allegedly had two wives. One year later, a
frustrated Congress enacted the Edmunds Anti-Bigamy Act,41 which
made it a misdemeanor in a territory of the United States to cohabit
with more than one woman. This meant that the government no
longer had to prove the existence of plural marriage to substantiate
bigamy charges, but now only had to show that defendants had un-
lawfully cohabited with one another. During this decade, more than
1,300 men were imprisoned for unlawful cohabitation,42 and the Ed-
munds Act further expanded punishment of polygamists to include
the disenfranchisement of polygamous voters and their disqualifica-
tion from public office.43
37. Ray Jay Davis, Plural Marriage and Religious Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. United
States, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 291 (1973).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher & Melanie Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presump-
.- on, 29 FAM. L. Q. 409 (1995).
40. Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1881).
41. Act of March 22, 1882, 22 Stat. 30-31 (1882) (repealed 1983).
42. B. H. ROBERTS, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 211 (1930).
43. Id. It must also be kept in mind that the LDS Church was an enormously powerful
religious community in the American West in the nineteenth century, and a potential threat to
the federal government in Washington, D.C. In addition to occupying Utah, the LDS Church
planned to expand into other territories, including parts of California, Oregon, Arizona, New
Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and all of Nevada and Utah. See Calhoun, supra note 10, at 1029.
See also infra note 48, and accompanying text.
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Finally, in 1887, the Mormon Church was prosecuted for its con-
tinuing advocacy of polygamy. In the case of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, the Court affirmed the power of
Congress to revoke the church charter and to confiscate its proper-
ty.44 Four months later, Wilford Woodruff, President of the Mormon
Church, issued a public statement, known popularly as the "Manifes-
to", in which he declared that the church no longer taught or prac-
ticed plural marriage, nor permitted its members to do so. He advised
all Mormons "to refrain from contracting any marriage forbidden by
the laws of the land. '45
On July 16, 1890, Congress passed legislation enabling Utah to
become a state, but required Utah's state constitution to include the
so-called "Irrevocable Ordinance," which stated that "Perfect tolera-
tion of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State
shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her
mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are
forever prohibited. 46
Today, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints makes it
clear that teaching or practicing polygamous or plural marriage is a
transgression of church law.47 Members who do practice polygamy
are excommunicated, and those who are not members and are prac-
ticing polygamy, are not accepted into membership. 48 However, po-
lygamous marriage has not died out in America. Some splinter
groups, calling themselves Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints, still
practice plural marriage in America, 49 as well as a number of Muslim
Americans and African Americans, 0 as will be discussed in more de-
tail below.
44. Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. U.S. 136
U.S. 1, 61-62 (1890).
45. G. LARSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD 264 (1971) (cited
in G. Keith Nedrow, supra note 12, at 313-14).
46. UTAH CONST. art. III.
47. THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, GENERAL HANDBOOK
OF INSTRUCTIONS 122 (1968).
48. See Ray Jay Davis, supra note 1, at 291-92.
49. See, e.g., David Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
53, 67-73 (1997) (discussing the continuing practice of polygamy by Fundamentalist Latter-day
Saints after 1890).
50. See, e.g., Michele Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy, 64 WASG. & LEE L. REV.
1461, 1469-70 (2007) (discussing Islamic polygamy and de facto polygamy in various African
American communities).
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C. Polygamous Marriage Today
One might assume that after the 1890s, polygamous marriage
would die out in the United States. Yet polygamy did not die out.
Many "fundamentalist" Mormons refused to renounce plural mar-
riage, regardless of threats of excommunication by the Mormon
Church and the possibility of criminal bigamy prosecution by the
state. Many fundamentalists regarded Wilford Woodruff's "Manifes-
to," and the "Irrevocable Ordinance" in the Utah state constitution,
as coerced, and therefore invalid.5 Most importantly,
existing plural families were loathe to dissolve, leaving wives with-
out husbands, [and] children without fathers. Many preferred to risk
prosecution rather than separate. . . . These recalcitrant Mormons
have resisted for [over] one hundred years what they believe to be
an impermissible intrusion upon their private lives and religious be-
liefs by state and federal governments.5 2
More than a century after this schism within the Mormon
Church, Mormon fundamentalists have established polygamous
communities throughout the United States, including Hildale, Utah
and Colorado City, Arizona. 3 In order to avoid prosecution for big-
amy, many fundamentalist men legally marry their first wife, and
then "spiritually marry" their subsequent wives.5 4 Over the years,
there have been few criminal prosecutions5" resulting from these po-
lygamous unions. However:
51. This argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Bar-
low, 153 P.2d 647, 654 (1944). In reviewing the Mormon experience in America, however, I
believe there is indeed a strong showing of federal governmental coercion See generally, supra
Part II.B. See also Donald L. Drakeman, Reynolds v. United States: The Historical Construction of
Conventional Reality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 700 (2004) (arguing that in passing the Mor-
rill Act, and other related Acts, the federal government's underlying desire was to divest the
LDS Church of its power).
52. G. Keith Nedrow, supra note 12, at 314.
53. See JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HFAVFN: A STORY OF VIOLENT
FAITH 1, 9-12 (2003).
54. Id. at 12. This means, however, that the "spiritual wives" are deprived of those legal
rights normally associated with marriage, including spousal support and maintenance, marital
property rights, intestate succession, workers compensation benefits, wrongful death actions,
and social security benefits.
55. For an exception to this general rule, see State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 825 (Utah,
2004). Thomas Green, an avowed polygamist, was found guilty of violating Utah's bigamy stat-
utes, after appearing on various television talk shows and NBC Dateline. Notoriety from televi-
sion talk shows can have some unexpected legal consequences. See also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d
726, 730-31 (2006) (defendant was convicted of unlawful sex with a 16 year old minor who was
one of his "wives").
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While polygamy is illegal in the United States, forms of it are still
practiced either overtly, pursuant to religious traditions, or covertly,
by the maintenance of two or more family units. Historically, the
prosecution of polygamists has been rare in the United States, and a
growing tolerance has been shown towards them .... It has been
estimated that as many as 60,000 individuals practice polygamy in
the United States.5 6
Critics of these isolated fundamentalist polygamous communities
have highlighted three negative implications of polygamy: (1) under-
age marriage, child abuse, and incest; (2) subjugation of women; and
(3) welfare fraud.57 As I will argue later in this article,5" state and fed-
eral remedies, that are much less onerous than prohibiting a person's
right to marry per se, already exist to combat these problems. Moreo-
ver, polygamist marriages are not confined only to isolated funda-
mentalist communities.
Indeed, there are various women's websites, interest groups, and
TV mini-series currently extolling the virtues of polygamy. 9 For ex-
ample, a woman attorney, Elizabeth Joseph, wrote an opinion piece
in the New York Times describing her own polygamous marriage, ar-
guing that polygamy offers women a viable solution for "successfully
juggling career, motherhood, and marriage."6 Home Box Office also
produced a television series, entitled Big Love, that sympathetically
portrays a fictional middle-class polygamist family, consisting of a
husband and his three wives, who live in Salt Lake City.'
Polygamous marriage is not limited only to the Mormon experi-
ence, since a number of Evangelical Christian Americans and Muslim
Americans also practice overt or covert polygamy in the United
States today.62 Muslim Americans cite to verse 4.3 of Islam's Holy
56. See Alexandre, supra note 49, at 1463.
57. See Alyssa Rower, supra note 2, at 715, 715-17. But see also Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy
and Same-Sex Marriage-Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM.
& MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 559, 585 (2008) ("although research indicates that women in polyga-
mous marriages often face sexual, physical, and emotional abuse at the hands of their husbands,
such abuse similarly occurs within monogamous heterosexual and [same-sex] married and un-
married relationships.")
58. See infra Part tll.C.
59. See, e.g., Jeffrey Michael Hayes, Polygamy Comes Out of the Closet: The New Strategy of
Polygamy Activists, 3 STANFORD J.C.R. & C.L. 99, 108-09 (2007) (discussing the use of polyg-
amous wives as spokespersons, and the use of other female interest groups, in the pro-polygamy
movement).
60. Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband's Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A31.
61. HBO Television, Big Love (2007).
62. See Eliza Souk, Polygamists Unite! They Used to Live Quietly, but Now They're Making
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Qur'an, which allows a man to have up to four wives, so long as he
can adequately provide for them, and treat them justly. 3 Polygamous
marriages are legally recognized in many African, Asian, and Muslim
countries under Islamic Shari'ah law. 4 Although the practice of po-
lygamy is in a decline throughout the Muslim world due to social and
economic factors, arguments for and against its legality and morality
are still being made. The four most commonly advanced arguments
supporting polygamy are as follows: (1) the Qur'an, (like the Old Tes-
tament of the Bible) gives religious authority to a man having more
than one wife; (2) polygamy is justified when the wife is barren or
unwell, allowing the husband to have children without divorcing his
first wife or leaving her ill provided for; (3) polygamy helps to pre-
vent immorality, such as prostitution, rape, fornication, adultery, and
the high divorce rate found in many Western monogamous societies;
and (4) polygamy protects widows and orphans by responding to the
excess of women over men in time of war or other disasters.65 Similar
arguments have been made supporting plural marriage in America,
including the rising incidence of extramarital sex and a soaring di-
vorce rate. 66
De facto polygamy also is prevalent in a number of African Amer-
ican communities. 67 Various reports have shown that a number of Af-
rican American women, including those belonging to the middle and
Noise, NEWSWEEK Mar. 20, 2006 at 52 (stating that the total number of Evangelical Christian
and Muslim polygamists in America may now outnumber Mormon polygamists). Early Chris-
tian teachings, for example, did not prohibit polygamy. See, e.g., notes 12 and 14, supra, and ac-
companying text.
63. See supra note 13, and accompanying text.
64. Although polygamous marriages, valid in the countries where contracted, will not be
recognized as valid marriages in the United States, some states still allow polygamous wives to
recover in intestate succession actions as putative spouses. See, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir's Es-
tate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). But see contra Moustafa v. Moustafa, 888 A.2d
1230, 1234 (Md. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to recognize a foreign bigamous marriage based on
the forum state's strong public policy). See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR.. THE L.AW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN 1THE UNITED STATES Sec. 2.6, 64-70 (2d ed. 1988).
65. See HODKINSON, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 107-08 (1984). Some
recent commentators have argued that the patriarchal culture that has influenced Islamic juris-
prudence in family. law matters over the centuries should yield to the Qur'anic Principle of
Equality. See, e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law, and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights,
12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 42-43 (1997).
66. See, e.g., Nedrow, supra note 12, at 304 n. 5.
67. See, e.g., Alexandre, supra note 49, at 1469-70 (citing Adrian K. Wing, Polygamy from
Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black America, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 857-59
(2001) (noting that polygamy does not occur "only among breakaway Mormon sects" and that"various forms of polygamy exist in the United States" today)).
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professional classes, have begun to adhere to the philosophy that in-
formal polygamy might be their only option if they are to have a fam-
ily. A major reason for this phenomenon is that African American
women are reminded that African American men are increasingly un-
available for marriage-due to early death, imprisonment, high un-
employment, and intermarriage. Additionally, many more young Af-
rican American women have obtained higher educations than African
American men, which further widens the gap between these women
and men available for marriage.68
In conclusion, approximately eighty-three percent of human soci-
eties permit polygamy.69 Polygamy is still practiced world-wide, in-
cluding the United States, and polygamy enjoys a rich cultural and
religious tradition spanning centuries of human history and experi-
ence.70 Polygamous men and women enter plural unions for signifi-
cantly different reasons, and with significantly different goals and as-
pirations. Accordingly, polygamous marriage should no longer be
characterized one-dimensionally, as in Reynolds v. United States, as a
"harmful" and "evil" marital relationship.71 Finally, as Professor
Cheshire Calhoun persuasively argues:
Opponents might object that, in fact, polygamy, as it is practiced
worldwide, tends to take forms that are oppressive to women. Per-
mitting polygamous civil marriage would thus open the doors to il-
liberal ethnic groups in the United States practicing social forms of
polygamy that are oppressive to women. Two responses to this ob-
jection bear noting.
First, unless we are willing to also eliminate monogamous civil mar-
riage because it, too, sometimes takes social forms that are oppres-
sive to women, targeting polygamy for a special bar would involve
the state in a clear failure to exercise neutrality with respect to al-
ternative conceptions of [marriage] ....
Second, the existence of ethnic and religious groups in the United
States that practice gender oppressive forms of polygamy is all the
more reason to extend civil marriage to polygamous groups... Fail-
68. Id.
69. See, e.g. DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING 79, 178 (1994) (summarizing a study of 853 cultures world-wide).
70. See, e.g., Gher, supra note 56, at 599 ("[P]olygamy is not merely an anomaly in West-
ern cultures. Polygamy is practiced around the world, as well as within many American com-
munities.").
71. Id. at 603.
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ure to extend civil marriage to plural marriages leaves [plural wives]
unprotected by marriage and divorce law .... 72
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING POLYGAMOUS
MARRIAGE
In addition to cultural and religious justifications for polygamous
marriage,73 there are at least three major arguments, based upon re-
cent constitutional developments, which would-and should-
overrule Reynolds v. United States, and legitimize polygamous mar-
riage in America today. The archaic and moralistic Victorian ra-
tionale of Reynolds v. United States is no longer supportable based up-
on significant doctrinal developments since the Reynolds case was
decided in 1879. First, polygamous marriage should be recognized
under a fundamental constitutional right to marry argument. Second,
polygamous marriage should be protected under an individual's first
amendment right to freedom of religion. And third, polygamous
marriage should be protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteen Amendments of the United States Constitution.
A. Reynolds v. United States is an Outdated Moralistic Precedent that
Must be Rejected Based Upon Subsequent Significant Doctrinal
Developments
In the case of Reynolds v. United States,74 a seminal case that de-
clared polygamous marriage in the United States to be void ab initio,
Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing for the Court, noted that "the
question is raised, whether religious belief can be accepted as a justi-
fication of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land.""5 He
looked at the background of the First Amendment and concluded
that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere [reli-
gious] opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order."76 Waite then classified
polygamy as an "evil" and "odious" act over which Congress had the
legislative power to prohibit."
72. Calhoun, supra note 10, at 1040-41 (emphasis in original).
73. See generally, supra Part II.
74. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162 (1879).
75. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 164.
77. See generally, Davis, supra note 1, at 289-91.
2991
There were no cases that Morrison Waite could use as preceden-
tial authority for these conclusions, and his "opinion versus action"
rationale has been greatly eroded by subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,7" members of the Amish re-
ligion were convicted for refusing to send their children to public
high school, as required by Wisconsin's compulsory education law.
The Supreme Court refused to utilize Waite's "opinion versus ac-
tion" rationale, and instead applied a balancing of interests approach
to religious opinion cases:
No longer is there the sharp dichotomy that Waite expounded in
the Reynolds case. Yoder recognizes its erosion: the protection of the
first amendment extends not only to religious opinion, but also to
some religious acts .... What has evolved in more recent cases has
been a weighing process in which the importance to the individual
of the practice involved [such as polygamous marriage] is weighed
against the interest of society; in order for restrictions on religiously
based actions to be constitutionally valid there must be "a state in-
terest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming pro-
tection under the free exercise clause."7 9 The judiciary is now guid-
ed by the balance of these interests, not solely by contemporary
societal mores as the Reynolds Court had suggested.8"
And how are American polygamists "in violation of social duties
or subversive of good order?" '81 Do they riot in the streets, and burn
down public buildings? Do they engage in wild bacchanal sex orgies
and entice other Americans to join them? Or do polygamists, like
other Americans, have a constitutional right to make "moral and sex-
ual choices" of their own, free from governmental intrusion?82
One particularly outrageous application of the antiquated and
moralistic Reynolds rationale was the case of Cleveland v. United
States,83 where the Supreme Court had no trouble finding that the in-
terstate transportation of a woman for the purpose of making her a
plural wife, was a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, commonly
78. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972).
79. Id. at 214.
80. Davis, supra note 1, at 297-98 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164; Yoder, 406 U.S. at
214).
81. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
82. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694-95 (2014) (holding that the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, which discriminated against same-sex spouses-and polygamous
spouses-was unconstitutional). See also infra note 137, and accompanying text.
83. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
[Vol. 29BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
299 "INw rnone o usad n Wvs
known as the Mann Act.8 4 The Mann Act provides in relevant part
that a woman or girl may not be transported in interstate commerce
"for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other im-
moral purpose,"85 and the Supreme Court reasoned in the Cleveland
case that "[t]he establishment or maintenance of polygamous house-
holds is a notorious example of promiscuity. The permanent adver-
tisement of their existence is an example of the sharp repercussions
which they have in the community .... These polygamous practices
have long been branded as immoral in the law." '86 Yet there was also a
prescient dissent by Justice Murphy in the Cleveland case:
It is equally true that the beliefs and mores of the dominant culture
of the contemporary world condemn the practice [of polygamy] as
immoral and substitute monogamy in its place. To those beliefs and
mores I subscribe, but that does not alter the fact that polygyny is a
form of marriage built upon a set of social and moral principles. It
must be recognized and treated as such.
The Court states that polygamy is "a notorious example of
promiscuity." The important fact, however, is that, despite the dif-
ferences that may exist between polygamy and monogamy, such dif-
ferences do not place polygamy in the same category as prostitution
and debauchery.87
The major problem here, of course, is that the Supreme Court, in
the Reynolds and Cleveland cases, treats polygamy as a species of sexual
misconduct and immoral promiscuity, rather than as an alternative
form of marriage.88 However, significant doctrinal developments
made by the United States Supreme Court and Congress, have fatally
eroded the long-standing moralistic rationale of Reynolds v. United
States, as discussed in more detail in the next section.
84. 18 U.S.C § 2421 (1976).
85. Id.
86. Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 19.
87. Id. at 25-26 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Laura E. Brown, Regulating the Many-
ing Kind: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Polygamy Under the Mann Act, 39
McGFORGE L. REv. 267, 297 (2008) ("The growing concern about polygamy among Mormon
fundamentalists in the western states and among Islamic immigrants in New York may lead to
[morel federal Mann Act prosecutions.").
88. See generally Nedrow, supra note 12, at 315-18.
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B. Marriage is a Fundamental Constitutional Right-Including
Polygamous Marriage
In the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,89 44 years after the Reynolds deci-
sion, the Supreme Court in dicta stated that there was a constitution-
al right to marry under the liberty guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed .... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to ac-
quire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience ... 90
Further, in the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia," which declared
state miscegenation laws to be unconstitutional, a unanimous Su-
preme Court stated that:
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to
our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom
on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of the
law. 92
It was not until 1978, however, in the case of Zabocki v. Redhail,93
that the Supreme Court forcefully declared that the right to marry
was a basic freedom guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Zablocki involved the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that
forbade the issuance of a marriage license to a person under a court
order who failed to support his or her minor children. The Supreme
Court noted that there were less onerous means of collecting child sup-
port, rather than prohibiting marriage per se,94 and therefore legisla-
tion that "directly and substantially" interferes with the fundamental
89. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
90. Id. at 399.
91. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
92. Id. at 12 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
93. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
94. Id. at 404.
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right to marry must now satisfy a higher standard of constitutional
review-the "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state interest" test-in
order to prohibit marriage. 5
In reviewing state statutes pertaining to marital relations and
marital restrictions, the courts have struggled mightily to ascertain
which statutes should be tested by the "strict scrutiny/compelling
state interest" test, the "intermediate level of scrutiny" test, or the"rational basis" test."6 And it does not help that the Supreme Court
itself in recent decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas 7 and United States
v. Windsor"5 refuses to disclose what test should be applied in these
contemporary cases. 9"
According to the case of Washington v. Glucksherg,"1° whether the
prohibition of a fundamental right is subject to a "strict scruti-
ny/compelling state interest" test, or only a "rational basis" test gen-
erally is determined by whether a person's "fundamental liberty in-
terests" are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental."' 0 ' Therefore, same-sex marriage,
which lacks any cultural or historical basis, normally has been sub-
jected only to a rational basis test,"" unless there is a violation of a
state constitutional provision." 3 However, it is submitted that polyg-
amous marriage, based upon its rich world-wide cultural and reli-
gious history,"' must now be evaluated utilizing a "strict scruti-
ny/compelling state interest" test, despite opposition from the
majoritarian culture to the contrary.
95. Id. at 396.
96. For example, state statutes that only regulate marriage, rather than prohibit marriage
per se would only be subject to a rational basis test. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623
(S.D. N.Y. 1981) (holding that a New York statute forbidding underage marriage was subject
only to a rational basis test, since such a marriage was only delayed until the parties reached the
age of majority, rather than being prohibited per se).
97. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
99. To quote poet Robert Frost: "We dance around the circle and suppose; but the se-
cret sits in the middle and knows."
100. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
101. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
102. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 29-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 960 (Mass. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, 821
N.Y.S.2d 770, 780 (N.Y. 2006).
103. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 702-03 (2008) (applying a strict
scrutiny constitutional test); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)
(applying an intermediate level of scrutiny constitutional test).
104. See generally supra Parts II and III.
299] "I Now Pronounce you Husband and Wi/ves "
BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
However, assuming arguendo that polygamous marriage is judi-
cially evaluated utilizing only a rational basis test, then polygamous
marriage must still be recognized under contemporary constitutional
principles. Recognizing the similarities between same-sex and polyg-
amist relationships, Justice Scalia, for example, dissenting in the case
of Lawrence v. Texas,"'5 argued that "laws against bigamy" were also
called into question by the Court's decision in Lawrence. "If, as the
Court asserts," he wrote, "the promotion of majoritarian sexual mo-
rality is not even a legitimate state interest," then the laws against po-
lygamy cannot even "survive rational-basis review.."(6
In conclusion, significant doctrinal developments since Reynolds v.
United States now recognize that marriage is a fundamental constitu-
tional right, and whether courts apply a strict scrutiny/compelling
state interest test to polygamous marriage or only a rational basis test,
polygamous marriage should be treated as an alternative form of mar-
riage, rather than a species of immoral promiscuity or sexual miscon-
duct.
C. Polygamous Marriage is Protected by the First Amendment Right to
Freedom of Religion
If George Reynolds had made his freedom of religion argument
in support of polygamous marriage today, he would find a more sym-
pathetic and tolerant Supreme Court than the moralistic Victorian
Supreme Court of the late 1800's. First, he would discover that Chief
Justice Waite's "opinion versus action" rationale has now been great-
ly eroded, if not overruled sub silentio, by a "balancing of interests"
approach to religious freedom cases. " 7
For example, in the case of Sherbert v. Verner,"°8 the appellant, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, lost her job after she declined to work on
Saturdays, the Sabbath Day of her faith. Unable to find other work
for the same reason, she applied for unemployment benefits. The
South Carolina Unemployment Commission declined to extend any
105. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas sodomy statute was
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right to privacy of two persons of the same sex
to engage in intimate, consensual conduct).
106. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also Elijah J. Milne, Blaine
Amendments and Polygamy Laws: The Constitutionality of Anti-Polygamy Laws Targeting Religion,
28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 285-86 (2006).
107. See, e.g., supra Part IM.A.
108. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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benefits to her, finding that her religious restriction disqualified her,
and the courts below affirmed this finding."9 The Sherbert Court re-
versed and remanded for future proceedings, finding no compelling
state interest for enforcing the substantial infringement on appel-
lant's religion, because there was no abuse or danger that justified
such infringement. Justice Brennan wrote for the Sherbert majority,
"The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against
any governmental regulation of religious beliefs .... Government
may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief. . . nor penalize
or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious
views abhorrent to the authorities... ,1 ()
Justice Brennan conceded that there were certain "overt acts
prompted by religious beliefs or principles" that could be legislatively
restricted, but such "conduct or actions so regulated have invariably
posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.""'
Query: What "substantial threat to public safety" is posed by polyga-
mous marriage today?
Indeed, after Sherbert v. Verner, Professor Laurence Tribe sug-
gested that Reynolds v. United States may be a candidate for reconsid-
eration.1 2 Professor Tribe writes:
The Sherbert Court... advanced beyond earlier cases by making
overt use of the least restrictive alternative--compelling state inter-
est mode of analysis in a free exercise context .... Sherbert further
establishes that cost-saving and efficiency-and therefore presuma-
bly other even more diffuse concerns--do not constitute sufficient
justification for a substantial, albeit indirect, intrusion on religious
freedom. If this principle is to be taken seriously, it compels recon-
sideration of a variety of issues .... One such case is Reynolds v.
United States, in which the Court affirmed a polygamy conviction
over the Mormon defendant's religious objection. The Reynolds
Court perceived a sufficient secular purpose in preserving monog-
amous marriage and preventing exploitation of women. Few deci-
sions better illustrate how amorphous goals may serve to mask reli-
gious persecution .... The question, after Sherbert, must be whether
the monogamy-promotion goal is sufficiently compelling, and the
109. Id. at 399-400.
110. Id. at 402-403 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
111. Id. at403.
112. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTT1TTONAL LAw 853 (1978).
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refusal to exempt Mormons sufficiently crucial to the goal's attain-
ment, to warrant the resulting burden on religious conscience.
13
A second significant religious freedom case subsequent to Reyn-
olds v. United States was Wisconsin v. Yoder. 14 Yoder involved Amish
parents who were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory
public school attendance law.1"5 Defendant parents argued that send-
ing their children to public schools after the eighth grade violated
their religious beliefs and threatened their religious way of life." 6
The Supreme Court agreed with the freedom of religion argument
made by the defendant parents based upon a balancing of interests
test, rather than being guided solely by contemporaneous societal
mores as the Reynolds Court suggested.117 The Yoder Court also re-
jected the Reynolds rationale that "actions, even though religiously
grounded, are always outside the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. 118 Moreover, although the Amish
religion and culture is quite different from the majoritarian American
culture, the Amish still are entitled to their freedom of religion and
religious culture. Nevertheless, "There can be no assumption that
today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are
'wrong'. A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different."119
Accordingly, as Justice Douglas wrote as part of his dissenting opin-
ion in Yoder:
The Court rightly rejects the notion that actions, even though reli-
giously grounded, are always outside the protection of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment. In so ruling, the Court de-
parts from the teaching of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164, where it was said concerning the reach of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, "Congress was deprived of all leg-
islative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good or-
der." In that case it was conceded that polygamy was a part of the
religion of the Mormons. Yet the Court said, "It matters not that
113. Id. at 852-54.
114. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 208-209.
117. See, e.g. the related discussion of Yoder in Part Ill.A.
118. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 247.
119. Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
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his belief [in polygamy] was a part of his professed religion; it was
still belief and belief only.Action, which the Court deemed to be an-
tisocial, could be punished, even though it was grounded on deeply
held and sincere religious convictions. What we do today, at least in
this respect, opens the way to give organized religion a broader base
than it has ever enjoyed; and it even promises that in time Reynolds
will be overruled.' 120
However in 1990, in the case of Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,'2 ' the Supreme Court rejected
this balancing of interests test found in Sherbert and Yoder. The Smith
case involved two members of the Native American Church who
were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. 122 When
they sought unemployment benefits, the State of Oregon rejected
their claims on the ground that consumption of peyote was a crime. 123
The Supreme Court of Oregon, applying the Sherbert test, held that
the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 24 But the United States Supreme Court reversed, stat-
ing that use of the Sherbert and Yoder balancing of interests test"would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious ex-
emptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.' 12
The Court held that under the First Amendment, "neutral, generally
applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not
supported by a compelling governmental interest. 1 21 Congress re-
sponded swiftly to the Smith case by enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 127 which applies both to the federal
government and to a number of states and restores the Sherbert and
Yoder balancing of interests test to religious freedom controversies.
In its most recent religious freedom decision, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,'12 the Supreme Court had to decide if a for-profit
closely held corporation was mandated by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Health Care Act (ACA) to provide health insurance cov-
120. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
121. Employ. Div. Oregon Dep't. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
122. Id. at 874.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 875.
125. Id. at 888.
126. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997); see generally Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
128. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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erage for abortion-inducing drugs and devices in violation of the
company owners' constitutional protection of religious freedom.'29
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby recognized
that they were bound by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) in deciding this religious freedom controversy.1 30
The RFRA basically prohibits the "'Government [from] substan-
tially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability' unless the Government
'demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est.' '131 Thus, not only has the balancing of interests test and compel-
ling state interest test been rehabilitated in the Sherbert and Yoder
cases, but the RFRA has gone one step further in requiring a "least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est. 132
Accordingly, any prohibition against polygamous marriage must
likewise meet these stringent requirements of the RFRA, in addition
to the earlier Sherbert and Yoder decisions. For example, some oppo-
nents of polygamous marriage argue that there have been three nega-
tive implications to polygamous marriage in isolated American polyg-
amous communities: "(1) underage marriage, child abuse, and incest;
(2) subjection of women; and (3) welfare fraud."'13  Yet there are state
and federal remedies already in place, such as child abuse statutes and
welfare fraud statutes, to combat these problems. These apply both to
monogamous marriage as well as polygamous marriage and are a
"least restrictive means" rather than prohibiting polygamous mar-
riage per se. Therefore, polygamous marriage today arguably is pro-
tected by the First Amendment right to freedom of religion under
the RFRA.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2754 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 1(a), (b)).
132. Id. at 2780.
133. Rower, supra note 2, at 715.
[Vol. 29BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
299 "INwPooneyuHsadadWvs
D. Polygamous Marriage Is Protected by the Due Process Clauses of 'the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
The seminal case of Lawrence v. Texas 134 held that a constitution-
al right to privacy existed for two persons of the same sex who en-
gaged in intimate consensual sexual conduct, although such conduct
was in violation of a Texas sodomy statute. 3 ' But query: Should this
constitutional due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution also extend to marriage and
marriage-like relationships? In Lawrence, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments "afford constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education."' 3 6 Justice Kennedy, writing for the ma-
jority, cautioned that the Lawrence case was a limited holding:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve per-
sons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in rela-
tionships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not in-
volve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter. 37
Although a number of commentators have argued that the Law-
rence decision should be extended to include same-sex marriage as
well, 13 1 in practice, courts thus far have refused to apply a Lawrence-
based rationale to validate polygamous marriage. For example, in the
case of Bronson v. Swensen,139 a Utah federal district court judge held
the following:
Giving the required deference to the Supreme Court's own stated
limitations of its Lawrence holding, this court cannot hold that Law-
rence can be read to require the State of Utah give formal recogni-
tion to a public relationship of a polygamous marriage. Contrary to
134. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 574.
137. Id. at 604.
138. See, e.g., Carlos Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Many: Same-Sex Mar-
riage and the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184 (2004); Laurence Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV.
1893 (2004); Mark Strasser, The Lawrence Reader: Standhardt and Lewis on Women in Love, 24
ST. Louis UNwV. PuB. L. REV. 59 (2005).
139. Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (D. Ct. Utah, 2005).
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the Plaintiffs' assertion, the laws in question here do not preclude
their private sexual conduct. They do preclude the State of Utah
from recognizing the marriage of Plaintiff G. Lee Cook to Plaintiff
J. Bronson as a valid marriage under the laws of the State of
Utah.14
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent to the Lawrence opinion.
He strongly argued that the majority's ruling in Lawrence would call
into question state laws against bigamy, among other statutes that are
based on moral choices.141 Scalia then concluded:
At the end of its opinion-after having laid waste the foundations of
our rational-basis jurisprudence-the Court says that the present
case "does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to en-
ter." Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unrea-
soned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earli-
er passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the constitutional
protections afforded to "person decisions relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and ed-
ucation" and then declares that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relation-
ship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do . ..142
So what does the Lawrence case stand for in reference to polyga-
mous marriage? Although the Lawrence decision is difficult to inter-
pret, two key points may be drawn from this opinion. First, even
when viewed most narrowly, the majority opinion in Lawrence "poked
a hole" in the government's traditional use of morality and history to
justify a statute-which arguably could include the now-discredited
moralistic and historical rationales used to justify the ban on polyga-
mous marriage in Reynolds v. United States. 143 Second, Lawrence now
leaves the door open to challenge anti-polygamy statutes, through
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. 144
The question of how narrowly-or how expansively-Lawrence v.
Texas should be interpreted was addressed once again in the case of
140. Id. at 1334, reaffirming Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing Utah law).
141. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
143. See Rower, supra note 2, at 724; see generally supra Part IH.A.
144. See, e.g., RoWER, supra note 2, at 725.
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United States v. Windsor.14 5 Windsor involved two women, residents of
New York, who were married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Can-
ada in 2007."4 When one of the spouses, Thea Spyer, died in 2009,
she left her estate to her surviving spouse, Edith Windsor.147 When
Windsor sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviv-
ing spouses, she was barred from doing so under the federal Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), which excluded a same-sex partner from
the definition of "spouse," even though New York law deemed their
Ontario marriage to be a valid one.' 48 In DOMA, § 3 provided in rel-
evant part:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bu-
reaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife. 149
Note that within this definition of marriage, Congress intended
to prohibit polygamous marriage, as well as same-sex marriage, by
requiring that the legal union be between one man and one woman, to
the exclusion of all others.
The Windsor majority opinion, again written by Justice Kennedy,
held that § 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional as a "deprivation of the
liberty of a person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution. ' 150 Kennedy continued,
[L]iberty protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the
equal protection of the laws. While the Fifth Amendment itself
withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in
the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Four-
teenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more
specific and all the better understood and preserved.''
145. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
146. Id. at 2679.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2682-83.
149. 1 U.S.C. §. 7 (emphasis added).
150. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at2695.
151. Id.
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Justice Kennedy concluded that "[t]his opinion and its holding
are confined to those lawful [same sex] marriages."' 52
Once again, there was a scathing dissent to Windsor written by
Justice Scalia. First, he agreed with Chief Justice Roberts' dissent that
the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction in this particular case because
Windsor already had won her case in the courts below, and so had"cured" her injury."3 Then Scalia laid waste to the majority's conten-
tion that Windsor was "confined" only to "lawful [same sex] marriag-
es":
The penultimate sentence of the majority's opinion is a naked dec-
laration that '[t]this opinion and its holding are confined" to those
couples "joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the
State". ... I have heard such "bald, unreasoned disclaimer[s] be-
fore . . . . Now we are told that DOMA is invalid because it "de-
means the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects," with an accompanying citation of Lawrence. It takes real
cheek for today's majority to assure us, as it is going out the door, to
give formal recognition to same-sex marriage [or arguably to polyg-
amous marriage as well] is not at issue here ... I promise you this:
The only thing that will "confine" the Court's holding is its sense of
what it can get away with. 54
Thus, the Supreme Court in Windsor concluded that § 3 of
DOMA could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because the"principal purpose and necessary effect [of § 3] are to demean those
persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage," and-like the un-
married same-sex couple in Lawrence-have a constitutional right to
make "moral and sexual choices." 155
So query: Don't parties to polygamous or plural marriage also
have the same constitutional right to make "moral and sexual choic-
es" of their own, according to those same constitutional protections
found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution? I would respectfully submit that they do.
152. Id. at 2696.
153. Id. at 2698-2705.
154. Id. at 2709 (internal citations omitted).
155. Id. at 2694-95.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Polygamous marriage, like same-sex marriage, traditionally has
been held to be a void ab initio marriage in the vast majority of Amer-
ican states. Unlike same-sex marriage, polygamous or plural marriage
has enjoyed a rich historical tradition throughout the world, includ-
ing the United States, where plural marriage still exists today, either
overtly or covertly.
Polygamous marriage was prohibited in Reynolds v. United States,
an 1879 United States Supreme Court case which continues to be
recognized as binding legal authority in America. Based upon recent
constitutional developments, Reynolds v. United States should be over-
ruled and polygamous marriage should be validated for a number of
compelling reasons. First, the archaic and moralistic Victorian ra-
tionale of Reynolds is no longer supportable based upon significant
doctrinal developments since the Reynolds case was decided in 1879;
polygamous marriage should now be recognized under a fundamental
right to marry. Second, polygamous marriage should be protected
under a person's First Amendment right to freedom of religion, as
found in a number of subsequent Supreme Court cases as well as the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Finally, polygamous
marriage arguably is protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, as is,
apparently, same-sex marriage.
Therefore, proponents of polygamous marriage today have a very
strong case for validating polygamous or plural marriage on cultural,
religious, and constitutional grounds.
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